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Abstract. The use of algorithms to predict behaviour is becoming the gold standard in criminal justice in various countries.
This article critically analyses the algorithm-driven risk assessment tools used in predictive policing and predictive justice. First,
we propose to see algorithms as essentially bureaucratic instruments. They are the digital offspring of the classic bureaucratic
procedure, creating classification through standardised and impersonal decision-making. Second, we argue that the application
of algorithms in criminal justice expands the bureaucratic field to areas previously understood as bulwarks of professional
judgement. Third, we analyse the shift in purpose of algorithmic decision-making: instead of determining a citizen’s status
of beneficiary or obligate, we now see algorithmic anticipation of behaviour. This shifts the logic of decision-making over
investigations, probations, and sentencing from individual judgement to bureaucratic classification based on the algorithms that
are designed into risk assessments tools. This article is both a bureaucratic critique of algorithm-driven risk assessment tools in
criminal justice and a call to rethink bureaucracy and bureaucratisation beyond the boundaries of public administration.
Keywords: Predictive policing, predictive justice, algorithms, information and communication technology
1. Introduction
In the key scene in the episode Nosedive of the British series Black Mirror, Bryce Dallas Howard’s
character, a young woman named Lacie Pound finds out that she can rent her fiendishly expensive dream
apartment in the ‘Pelican Cove Lifestyle Community’ with a personal score higher than 4.5. According
to her leasing agent, a score above 4.5 would qualify her for a 20% discount on the rent. Such a score is
created by reviews on a scale of one to five by other people. Socially desirable behaviour, saying hello
to the woman walking past you on your morning commute for instance, creates a higher rating. Also,
dealing with persons with a higher rating increases your personal score. Through special lenses, a sort of
Google Glass which contextual information projected on your glasses, you immediately see the ranking
of the people around you and you can give them points for their behaviour.
Black Mirror is a British sci-fi series about the murky relationship between humans and technology.
In the episode Nosedive, we are confronted with Lacie’s doomed attempt to improve her personal rating.
Having a high score comes with advantages and having low status can bar you from restaurants, work,
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and even health care. When you end up below 2.5, you are part of the social underclass. Ultimately,
Lacie, a moulded 4.2 star rated citizen, fails to be a 4.5. She slides down to the gritty and grim bottom of
society and ends up in prison where she is stripped of technology. Broken and tired, but relieved to be in
a place where she can finally tell how she feels and what she thinks, without fear of being ranked down.
Watching the episode Nosedive, we are inevitable reminded of the neoliberal logic of competition and
individualism, which is expressed by the fact that on social media one accumulates ‘likes’ (Facebook),
‘views’ (YouTube) and ‘followers’ (Twitter). But we are also reminded of the way our life is influenced
by all kinds of consumer scores, created by score modellers who feed raw data into an algorithm de-
signed to trawl through reams of data to detect patterns. Through consumer scores, people are ‘ranked,
separated, shifted, and otherwise categorized and also predicted their potential future actions’ (Dixon &
Gellman, 2014: 6). Although many of these consumer scores are in the field of social media, they are also
used in health, the labour market, and justice. Our interest in this article is the criminal justice system,
in which authorities increasingly use computer-generated scores for purposes of crime prevention and
to decide whether a criminal defendant is likely to reoffend or not. This phenomenon has far-reaching
social consequences and brings up all sorts of questions, from ‘which kind of scores are used and for
what purpose?’ to ‘how can we guarantee that the algorithms underlying the scores make fair decisions?’
In the following, we discuss several examples of ‘ranking citizens’ in the criminal justice system.
From predictive policing to predictive justice, the criminal justice system in various countries relies
increasingly on algorithm-driven risk assessments, which produce all kind of scores (e.g. Fitzgibbon,
2008; Hannah-Moffat, 2013; Van Eijk, 2017). Within the academic debate on the use of these tools and
the role of algorithms, the focus is often on their negative or positive impacts on citizens, such as po-
tential discriminatory effects. In this article, however, we aim to broaden the discussion by focusing on
their effect on the bureaucratic field – broadly defined as the rules of the game governing the actions
of public institutions entrusted with the maintenance of the legal order (Bourdieu et al., 1994; Wac-
quant, 2004). Our argument is threefold. First, we propose to see algorithms as essentially bureaucratic
instruments. They are the digital offspring of the classic bureaucratic procedure, creating classification
through standardised and impersonal processing of data. Second, we argue that the application of algo-
rithms in criminal justice expands the bureaucratic field to areas previously understood as bulwarks of
professional judgement. And third, new technological possibilities to analyse big data lead to a shift in
the objectives of governments: instead of merely determining a citizen’s status as beneficiary or obligate,
information technology is now used for the algorithmic anticipation of behaviour of citizens. As a conse-
quence, the ‘datafication of criminal justice’ (Smith et al., 2017: 260) shifts the logic of decision-making
over investigations, probations, and sentencing from individual judgement to bureaucratic classification
based on the algorithms that are designed into risk assessments tools.
We begin our argument by analysing the existing literature on the relation between bureaucracy and
information and communication technology. In public service, information and communication technol-
ogy is often used to increase efficiency by reducing red tape. However, critical studies show that informa-
tion and communication technology relies on mechanisms that increase control over decision-making.
Next, we apply this perspective to the field of criminal justice and describe two algorithm-driven risk
systems, which have become a common element in decisions over surveillance and sentencing: predic-
tive policing and predictive justice. We analyse the way both systems stress bureaucratic classification
over individual judgement. In the discussion, we reflect on the bureaucratic nature of algorithms and
propose to rethink the state-centred conception of contemporary bureaucracy and bureaucratisation.
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2. Bureaucracy, information and communication technology, and algorithmic anticipation
2.1. Bureaucracy: Knowledge and control
One of the defining characteristics of the modern state is the invention of the bureaucracy. Ever since
Weber (1921/1922) noted the emergence of the bureaucracy as part of a broader process of rationalisation
of government and economy, it has been viewed upon as a Janus-faced organisation, looking two ways
at once. According to Gouldner, ‘on the one side, it was administration based on expertise; while on the
other, it was administration based on discipline’ (1954: 22). Without notable exceptions, the bureaucracy
is known as the prime organisational ‘vehicle’ for governing through knowledge of citizens and the
population as a whole. Consequently, Weber speaks of the bureaucracy in terms of ‘authority through
knowledge’ (2006a: 226). Bureaucracy’s other face – its disciplining nature – is symbolised in Weber’s
notion of the ‘iron cage’ (Weber, 2006b: 201):1 a system in which humans are reduced to the instrumental
cogs of a mechanistic machine and where reflection on values and objectives has been pushed out in
favour of self-perpetuating procedures and control mechanisms.
In both expertise and discipline, the bureaucracy embodies instrumental rationality: decisions are made
according to coherent rules, such as procedural rules that both define the ends and regulate the means of
action, clear expectations, specific time frames, and goals and measures of success (Clegg & Lounsbury,
2009). Importantly, this should not be equated with modern-day ‘efficiency’, but above all seen as a way
to realise predictable outcomes and reduce uncertainty (Gajduschek, 2003). While this stands in sharp
contrast with value rationality, in which decisions are made according to an absolute value of belief
(such as ideology or religion), it also makes rational-legal authority possible: rule exercised by officials
and institutions by virtue of formal rules and laws (Weber, 2006a: 219-222).
2.2. Information and communication technology: Infocracy and screen level bureaucrats
Technological advancements are a well-known means to increase a state’s capacity to gather knowl-
edge and exert power (Popitz, 1992: 181). A crucial development in the history of the state bureaucracy
is the digitalisation of its activities. The modern-day influence of information and communication tech-
nology on public bureaucracies has been well studied. For instance, Zuurmond (1994) speaks of the
emergence of the ‘infocracy’, a bureaucracy that revolves around the collection of data and automated
decision-making – including automatic number plate recognition for speeding tickets and automatic
decisions on the height of students grants based on the income of parents (Zouridis, 2000). In the cur-
rent age of big data, the possibilities are even bigger: larger amounts of data can be analysed than ever
before, data can be more easily shared among organisations, and algorithms can automate the analysis
process. This accelerates and expands the potential of public organisations to predict and profile people’s
behaviour (Sadin, 2009; Reigeluth, 2014).
Advocates of the use of information and communication technology in public administration argue
that it can be a valuable tool to combat several bureaucratic pathologies. Classic critiques already showed
that organisations with high levels of bureaucratisation tend to become rigid in their structure, closed off
from external influences, and have an alienating effect on their employees because of the abstract and
impersonal nature of bureaucratic work (Merton, 1940; Crozier, 1964; Tullock, 1965; Downs, 1967).
‘Neutral’ bureaucratic mechanisms transform into bureaucratic ‘pathologies’ (Acar & Aupperle, 1984).
1Though this is hardly a precise translation of the original German ‘stahlhartes Gehäuse’ (Klagge, 1997; Baehr, 2001).
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For instance, formalisation becomes red tape, impersonality becomes indifference, and specialisation
becomes fragmentation. Advocates of e-government suggest that information and communication tech-
nology can be used to cut red tape, speed up procedures, reduce fraud, and facilitate data sharing across
organisations (e.g. La Porte et al., 2002; OECD, 2005). Interestingly, these arguments for the use of in-
formation and communication technology are, by and large, not anti-bureaucratic, but proposals to make
bureaucracies work more efficient.
Information and communication technology is not just a tool that bureaucracies can use, but is, in
itself, fundamentally bureaucratic. This point has been made in various studies, pointing out that in-
formation and communication technology is a mechanism for simplification and closure (Kallinikos,
2005). Simplification is the process through which information technology breaks down a task or prob-
lem into sets of operations that need to be performed sequentially in order to solve it. Closure is the
necessary complement to simplification. It entails, according to Cordella and Tempini, ‘the isolation and
black boxing of the sequential operations, ensuring their execution is protected from external interfer-
ence’ (2015: 281). The use of information and communication technology has, therefore, triggered a
further centralisation and rationalisation of decision-making processes (e.g. Margetts, 1999). Informa-
tion technology-driven bureaucracies reduce the autonomy and discretionary space of professionals and
bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucrats transform into ‘screen level bureaucrats’ (Landsbergen, 2004) that
classify citizens rather than make factual assessments and decisions (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). Web
sites replace window clerks and information system replace case managers. As a consequence, human
interference in decision-making procedures is eliminated.
2.3. Algorithmic anticipation: surveillance capitalism and governance of security
So far, we have limited our discussion to the administrative domain – to public organisations charged
with deciding over eligibility to state benefits and or with enforcement of administrative law (e.g.
Zouridis, 2000). However, recent rapid developments in the widespread social use of information and
communication technology are opening up new fields for the use of algorithms. Companies like Apple,
Facebook, and YouTube are using customer data to offer personalised services or sell information to
companies for personalised marketing. Credit card companies use consumer scores to decide whether
to offer a client an extended credit line. Car insurance companies are tracking their clients’ driving
style to offer discounts for safe driving (Schuilenburg & Peeters, 2017). New technological possibilities
allow the quick analysis of vast amounts of data for the purpose of finding behavioural patterns (Mayer-
Schoenberger & Cukier, 2013). The algorithmic anticipation of behaviour is a powerful business model
(Sadin, 2009; Reigeluth, 2014) that Zuboff (2015) has called ‘surveillance capitalism’.
The surveillance capacity of modern information and communication technology has also been picked
up in criminal justice. The ‘proliferation of scoring and ranking citizens’ (Harcourt, 2015: 205) extends
to how likely a person is to commit a crime or whether a defendant is likely to commit new crimes. Here,
the objective is less financial and more deliberately control-oriented. While the use of statistical tech-
niques in criminal justice is not new, the number of algorithm-driven risk systems has vastly increased
over the past decades. According to Harcourt (2007), profiling and predicting have become a second na-
ture in the quest for security and prevention. A core element of these risk systems is their preoccupation
with behaviour. For the purposes of prevention and punishment, the behaviour of individuals and spe-
cific groups is monitored and predicted, and, where necessary, subjected to interventions (e.g. Peeters,
2013). It seems rather cliché and old hat to accentuate that surveillance has been deeply implicated in
all of this. However, it is important to realise that new forms of data analysis not only expand the op-
portunities for surveillance, but also add a new layer: the use of algorithms quantifies the singling out
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of places, individuals or specific groups with a higher chance of showing criminal activity, according to
the perceived risks of the used risk assessment tools. Instead of determining an individual’s status, data
is used to determine the risk individuals or groups pose. Just as a credit card company sees a client who
suddenly starts buying cheaper brands as a financial risk factor, the police can target individuals that
check the boxes of risk factors for criminal behaviour, such as criminal history, gender, age, low level of
education, no stable housing and unemployment.
The use of algorithms in criminal justice is in part a consequence of increased technological opportu-
nities, and in part of governmental efforts to predict and pre-empt risks as well as to broaden the govern-
mental concern beyond crime control to a wider security context (Schuilenburg, 2015). The convergence
of these developments creates a powerful incentive for the application of information technology and
algorithmic anticipation in previously uncharted domains. In the following, we analyse the existing liter-
ature on the emerging use of algorithms in criminal justice – more specifically: in predictive policing and
in predictive justice. We focus on how the bureaucratic nature of algorithms changes decision-making
in policing and criminal justice. As we move beyond the administrative domain – where information
technology and algorithms were used to determine a citizen’s status as beneficiary or obligatee – we en-
counter new areas of bureaucratic ‘colonisation’ (Habermas, 1987). Judgements and decisions in polic-
ing and sentencing are being subjected to the ‘violent abstraction’ (ibid.: 363) we, until recently, only
knew from classification mechanisms in public service organisations.
3. Predictive policing
The use of data to detect crimes has long been a central feature in security policies decision-making
processes. Smith and others (2017) mention examples of automated license plate recognition systems
and the emergence of the ‘techno-cop’ who is communicatively wired into command and control via
radio device, camera, and GPS tracker. Furthermore, data is used to detect and punish traffic violations,
such as speeding. Infractions are digitally captured and fines are automatically processed, thereby medi-
ating ‘the transaction between prosecutor and offender [. . . ] by the transfer of data’ (Smith & O’Malley,
2017: 278; O’Malley, 2010). More interesting for the purposes of this paper are the efforts to produce
representations of reality that ‘convert social acts into flows of data’ (Smith & O’Malley, 2017: 275). A
prominent application is traffic management, in which movements of vehicles are digitally converted to
be able to regulate the flow and circulation of cars through variable speed limits. Security assemblages
consisting of measures such as tracking devices, motion sensors, drones, radar guns, and smart software
are used to govern safe driving and road use.
The use of ‘predictive algorithms’ and ‘crime sensing’ (Smith & O’Malley, 2017; Williams et al.,
2017) takes this logic one step further. Instead of merely representing reality in flows of data, repre-
sentations of reality are projected into the future. By bringing together ‘big data’ from various sources
– ranging from criminal statistics to mining of individual’s social media texts and images – and auto-
matically analysing them, diagnostic conclusions are drawn to identify crime patterns and suspicious
individuals, as well as their geographical placement and their networked nature. The ultimate objec-
tive of these algorithm-driven risk assessment systems is to change the outcomes as they are predicted
through preventative action (Perry et al., 2013). Conceptually speaking, predictive policing is closely
related to other data-infused policing practices, such as intelligence-led policing, data-driven policing,
risk-based policing, hotspot policing, and evidence-based policing. What sets it apart is the explicit pro-
jection into the future, including the use of models that can predict changes in crime patterns instead of
mere extrapolation of existing data (Bennett Moses & Chan, 2016).
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Predictive policing can be used to make inferences about future crime on four different levels: 1) the
location where crimes will likely be committed (often called ‘hotspots’); 2) the identification of persons
more likely to commit crimes; 3) the time when crimes are likely to be committed; and 4) the combina-
tion of ‘where’, ‘who’, and ‘when’ (Asquer, 2014: 20). The basic assumption is that crimes, such as theft
and robberies, are to a large extent predictable, because criminals with a distinguishable profile tend to
commit the same type of crime, at roughly the same location and time of the day. Statistical methods
use existing police records on number and type of arrests and their geographical location to recognise
patterns in criminal behaviour, which in turn can facilitate a more preventative approach as well as a
more focused and quicker police response (Schuilenburg, 2016).
An example from the US is the system ‘PredPol’ (Predictive Policing), which uses an earthquake
prediction model to predict crimes such as gang violence and residential burglary. Similar to earthquake
aftershocks, these crimes tend to be temporarily high in a certain location after an initial report of a
‘background event’ (Bennett Moses & Chan, 2016). A similar Dutch example is the ‘Crime Anticipation
System’ (CAS), which is used by the police in Amsterdam. In this system, the city of Amsterdam is
divided in blocks of 125 by 125 meters. For each of these blocks, information about past crimes, distance
to known suspects, the type and number of crimes, and the demographic and socio-economic structure
is gathered. With regular two-week intervals, this information is updated and analysed for incorporation
in daily police operations (Schuilenburg, 2016; De Vries & Smit, 2016).
An interesting new data source for predictive policing is ‘big social data’ (Williams et al., 2017), i.e.
data voluntarily exposed by social media users (Harcourt, 2015). Governments use these data to track
down expressions of allegiance to extremist groups or disorder-related posts that might indicate future
criminal activity. A similar tactic is the analysis of Twitter posts to map crime patterns. For instance,
big data analysis of tweets on minor public incivilities can serve as confirmations of a ‘broken window
theory’ in a certain neighbourhood (Williams et al., 2017). Others have analysed tweets to map the
spread of cyberhate (Williams & Burnap, 2016), used the geolocation of tweets to pinpoint crime hot
spots (Malleson & Andresen, 2015) or showed that an absence of tweets is predictive of assaults, theft,
and disturbances of the social order (Bendler et al., 2014).
4. Predictive justice
Algorithms are not only transforming police practices, but the administration of the criminal justice
system as well. Against the background of a penology that is increasingly utilitarian instead of merely
retributive (Hamilton, 2015: 5), data is used by courts to predict ‘future dangerousness’ of individuals
(Kleiman et al., 2007; Berk, 2012; Berk & Bleich, 2013). The application of algorithms in the criminal
justice system, also referred to as ‘actuarial justice’ (Hamilton, 2015: 3), is used to estimate a defendant’s
flight risk and to assess his or her threat to public safety. ‘Actuarial prediction instruments’ (Sjöstedt &
Grann, 2002), ‘recidivism risk algorithms’2 and ‘risk assessment tools’3 are instruments that use vari-
ables about a defendant’s criminal history and socio-demographic characteristics to estimate whether
someone poses a high, moderate or low risk. Key variables are identified based on records of past crimi-
nal cases. The objective is to improve criminal sentencing, bail decisions, and rehabilitation programmes
2http://www.businessinsider.com/harvard-mathematician-reveals-algorithms-make-justice-system-baised-worse-black-
people-crime-police-2017-6 (accessed 12 January 2018).
3https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
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through evidence-based risk assessment. More specifically, algorithms aim to increase equity (treating
all risks the same), transparency (in the form of an objectified score), and efficiency (reducing lead times)
(Goel et al., 2016).
There are currently more than 200 risk assessment tools available in criminal justice and forensic
psychiatry, which are widely used to inform sentencing, parole decisions, and post-release monitoring
(Douglas et al., 2017: 134). In the US specifically, there are three main systems in use (COMPAS, PSA,
and LSI-R) with their own specific sets of variables. Interestingly, statisticians, mathematics, computer
scientists and software engineers working for private companies develop these systems and the exact
workings of the algorithms are, therefore, proprietary and not made public.4 Christin et al. (2015) iden-
tify four criminal justice areas in which predictive algorithms are used:
– Pre-trial and bail decisions: assessment of the risk that a defendant will engage in violent crime or
fail to show up in court. According to 2016 data, less than 10% of U.S. jurisdictions use pre-trial
risk assessments. However, support for their introduction is growing.5 A study of a pre-trial risk
score in Baltimore6 shows how the assessment of who will be a public safety or flight risk is based
on an algorithm that includes mitigating (age, employment, etc.) and aggravating (substance abuse,
previous arrests, etc.) risk factors. In a different tool, a set of scores is derived from 137 questions
about criminal past, criminal networks, drug use, a defendant’s violent character, and a defendant’s
view on criminal behaviour.7 These tools are supposed to help pre-trial services recommend bail
decisions and offer support programmes (such as drug rehabilitation) based on standardised and
objective criteria.
– Criminal sentencing: assessment of potential recidivism can play a role in determining the height of
a sentence. Its history goes back to at least 1984, when Sentencing Tables were created, a manda-
tory federal instrument to determine ranges of incarceration for serious federal crimes based on
offense level and criminal history of a defendant. Since 2005, these Tables are advisory, but still
have significant impact. Moreover, new risk assessment tools go beyond them and include factors
not directly connected to the crime, such as socio-demographic background. A well-documented
example is the case of Wisconsin v. Loomis, in which the defendant was given a long sentence for
his role in a drive-by shooting partially because of his ‘high risk’ score.8
– Parole and probation: assessment of prison inmates’ security classification, their eligibility for pa-
role, and levels of probation supervision. Instruments may measure both a defendant’s current living
situation and behaviour, and variables outside his or her direct control such as having parents with a
criminal background. Typically, this is where a broader notion of rehabilitation is introduced in risk
assessments. Besides risk of recidivism, a defendant’s need can be included as well to determine
treatment programmes, services, and supervision.9
– Juvenile justice: assess the eligibility of minors for specific types of detention or for release home.
In 2014, more than 300 jurisdictions in 39 US states are working with a risk assessment instrument
specifically designed to determine the most suitable form of detention and support programme for
juvenile delinquents.
4https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crim-justice/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
5http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
6http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
7https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (accessed 12 January 2018).
8The case is well known because the defendant challenged his sentence on the basis that he was not allowed to assess the
algorithm. In 2016, the state supreme court ruled that knowledge of the algorithm’s output was a sufficient level of transparency,
see: https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
9https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf (accessed 12 January 2018).
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5. Advocates and critics
In literature, advocates in favour of the use of algorithm-driven risk assessments to automate deci-
sions in police practices and the criminal justice system see the use of actuarial prediction tools as ways
of ‘scientization, economitization and democratization’ (Smith et al., 2017: 261). First, advances and
progress in science and technology open the door to new approaches for the assessment of risks and
dangerousness. As such, there is a strong belief that these new tools are capable of finding blind spots
and solving complex social problems. Second, actuarial prediction tools can improve government effi-
ciency. Law enforcement agencies, according to this economical argument, ‘can detect more crime with
the same resources if they investigate citizens who are at greater risk of criminal offending; and sen-
tencing bodies can reduce crime if they incapacitate citizens who are more likely to recidivate in the
future’ (Harcourt, 2005: 3). Third, there is a popular belief that these new tools are value-neutral ways
to generate knowledge and expertise within law enforcement. They not only save time and money, but
also make sentencing more accountable by protecting it against human bias and curb discriminatory and
racist sentencing practices (Christin et al., 2015).
In sharp contrast, a more critical perspective on algorithm-driven risk assessments points out the se-
rious concerns regarding reliability of the algorithms in predicting crime or recidivism. Full prediction
is unattainable, since ‘universal and perfect surveillance’ (Smith et al., 2017: 267) would be needed to
gather a truly complete set of data. Moreover, the sheer volume of data necessary to make a reliable pre-
diction ‘can overwhelm the critical signals in a fog of possible correlations’ (Crawford, 2014). A model
is always needed to select and sample relevant data, which necessarily increases chances of distortion
and ending up with ‘only speculative projections of historic patterns’ (Smith et al., 2017: 268). But relia-
bility in predictive algorithms is also far from self-evident on a more modest level. A practical constraint
is that existing biases in police data (such as unreported crime and previous arrests) are designed into
algorithms, thereby leading to an emphasis on already over-policed high-poverty and non-white areas.10
The available evaluations show mixed results in predictive reliability (Sjöstedt & Grann, 2002; Douglas
et al., 2017), and, moreover, reveal that non-white defendants are more often subjected to false positives
(regarded as high risk, but not re-offending) and white defendants more to false negatives (regarded as
low risk, but re-offending) (Rehavi & Starr, 2014).11
Others have raised concerns that actuarial prediction tools inscribe and alter rehabilitative approaches
to punishment (Brown, 2009: 182–189; Robinson, 2008): risks for the general public weigh heavier than
the needs of defendants, and, as a consequence, risk assessment tools trigger punishment rather than
weeding out low-risk defendants. This might be an unintended consequence of risk assessment tools,
but critics claim that these tools are politically and ideology-driven (Simon, 1988). Instead of the ‘get
tough’ ideology and discourse of the punitive turn in crime policies during the last decades (Garland,
2001), the actuarial turn presents a ‘much cooler, more nuanced foundation’ (Clear & Frost, 2014: 16)
for a punitive approach under the guise of objectivity and empiricism.
6. Machine justice
While many scholars have pointed to the dangers and promises of algorithm-driven risk assessments,
very little is known about how these tools influence the rules of the game governing the actions of public
10http://www.citylab.com/crime/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
11https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (accessed 12 January 2018).
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officials entrusted with the maintenance of the legal order. Nevertheless, we know from bureaucracy
critiques that the use of information and communication technology tends to diminish the discretionary
space of decision-makers at street-level (e.g. Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). Street-level bureaucrats be-
come, as several studies showed, dependent on data and the algorithms through which it is processed.
Additional to the above-mentioned arguments, we argue therefore that algorithm-driven risk assessments
push decision-making in policing and the criminal justice system away from professional assessment and
towards machine-like procedural classification. To put it paradoxically, although the machine learning
ability of algorithm-driven risk tools suggests that the decision-making process is in constant flux, the
use of these tools leads to more rigid and standardized behaviour.
Risk assessments were also used prior to the introduction of algorithms. For instance, judgements
on bail, parole, and probation have always been infused with concerns about recidivism and failure to
appear in court. However, these risk predictions were unstructured and unregulated. They were pro-
fessional judgements by judges and mental health clinicians, largely free of bureaucratic procedures
and sometimes infused by gut decisions (Hamilton, 2015: 5-9). In sharp contrast, as information and
communication technology standardises the bureaucratic field, by reducing social complexities into pre-
defined scores, algorithm-driven risk assessments will function according a machine-like logic: once an
algorithm is designed, outcomes are produced automatically, without human interference and, thereby,
jeopardising individualised justice. The diminishing of professional discretion by this kind of decision
displacement, in which algorithms function as the ‘digital recipe’ through which data is processed, is
strengthened by the fact that the currently available risk assessment tools are made by private compa-
nies and are therefore proprietary, which reduces them to black boxes closed for thorough evaluation
(Bennett Moses & Chan, 2016). This makes accountability for decisions regarding police deployment,
sentencing, probation, and bail highly problematic (Brucato, 2015; Hamilton, 2015).
One might object that the actors operating with systems of predictive policing and predictive justice
have the freedom to ignore algorithms and make their own assessments of individual cases. While this is
formally speaking the case, we argue that bureaucratic practice shows a tendency towards a self-imposed
reduction of professional discretion. Algorithms combine the quest for reducing social complexities into
predefined categories and risk factors with the quest for efficiency and objectivity. As a consequence,
the outcomes of an algorithm are more determined by its input and design than by the individual assess-
ment of a case. What is more, bureaucratic structures are highly disciplining for the behaviour of those
subjected to it (e.g. Weber, 1921/1922; Merton, 1940; Crozier, 1964; Tullock, 1965; March & Olsen,
1989). Furthermore, the voluntary subjection to bureaucratic rules is a common behavioural mechanism.
After all, ‘rules protect the people who submit to them’ (Crozier, 1964: 206). Rules provide a default
for action, and thus legitimacy. To deviate from them can be dangerous: the very existence of ‘objective’
scores has a chilling effect on the use of professional discretion. According to Hamilton, ‘[i]nstead of
caution, [. . . ] policymakers and judges seem impressed by the guise of empiricism, and in lieu of cri-
tiquing the fitness, validity, and reliability of risk tools, officials are more likely to reify them’ (2015:
49). Similarly, Nilsson and others (2009: 402) note a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach when it comes
to following rather than deviating from algorithms. The consequence of this all is that algorithms have
come to play the role of rules in Weber’s theory of instrumental rationality.
7. Conclusion and discussion
As our society continues to become more complex, with the proliferation and extension of algorithm-
driven risk assessments to all facets of life, cases like Lacie Pound’s in the television series Black Mirror
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will become increasingly common: automated scores based on the systematic collection of personal
data with potentially negative effects on the lives of citizens. In the episode Nosedive, rating citizens
takes the form of a softer, more invisible social control. Perceived anti-social behaviour is punished by
fellow citizens through a lower social score, which ultimately limits a person’s access to public and
private goods, such as housing, transport and restaurants. This type of scoring mechanisms is becoming
a reality in the criminal justice system, in which computer-generated scores produce new ways for the
authorities to identify future criminal behaviour. According to experts, the use of these risk assessments
may be the biggest shift in the governance of security since the criminal justice system began accepting
social science and other expert evidence more than a century ago.12
In the above, we have shown how algorithm-driven risk assessments are used to (1) predict future
criminal behaviour and to (2) administer a criminal justice outcome. Predictive policing and predictive
justice adopt two of the most important recent developments in this respect. First, they express the desire
to use knowledge of the population for assessing risk rather than determining status – in line with a more
behavioural and preventative approach to late-modern security issues. Second, algorithm-driven systems
are the main tools for the assessment of risks – whether to predict geographical locations of crime or
levels of dangerousness in individuals. The implicit message in the algorithms used in predictive policing
is: ‘the higher the risk, the more surveillance’. For predictive justice, the credo is: ‘the higher the risk,
the higher the punishment’.
We have argued that advocates of predictive policing and predictive justice highlight the benefits as-
sociated with risk assessment tools. An important argument is that the automatic tools do a better job
in ensuring public safety then ad-hoc and subjective assessments of police officers and judges. Critics
respond that algorithms produce a cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies because they are based on historical
crime data. They also share the concern that predictive algorithms produce discriminatory results be-
cause crime data is both incomplete (a large percentage of crime is not reported) as reflect longstanding
institutional biases along income, race and gender lines.
In addition to these arguments, we have argued that police practices and the administration of justice
are radically transformed by the technological opportunities and availability of data combined with the
preventative ambitions inherent to many security policies. While operating under a cloak of rationality,
algorithm-driven risk assessments present a specific threat because the outcomes do not ‘argue’ (they do
not present an argument or a reasoning, which includes revealing sources and assumptions, but present
a ‘truth’) and because they are increasingly generated automatically (not through human analysis, but
through algorithms). In terms of the rules of the game governing the actions of public institutions en-
trusted with the maintenance of the legal order, the cumulative effect of the use of algorithm-driven risk
tools makes bureaucracies operate more machine-like. Only this time around, algorithms instead of rules
are the source of the rationalisation of decision-making, the formalisation of the procedures for reaching
decisions, and the standardisation of the treatment of each case.
The bureaucratic nature of information and communication technology and its adoption in risk assess-
ment tools not only provides new relevant insights for the criminal justice system, but it also urges us
to broaden the scope of our thinking on bureaucracy. Weber thought of bureaucracy as a modern social
phenomenon, which extended over both public and private organisations. Today, we hardly associate
modern capitalistic organisations with the machine-bureaucracies of mass production on assembly lines
anymore. However, modern public service organisations have proven to be remarkably resilient in their
12https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/general/1460874/ai-in-the-court-when-algorithms-rule-on-jail-time.html (access-
ed 12 January 2018).
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bureaucratic nature (Meier & Hill, 2005). Most of the literature of the bureaucratic form is, therefore, fo-
cused on government and public administration (Peters, 2003; Olsen, 2006). It is, moreover, associated
with a very specific interpretation of bureaucracy, namely as an organisational structure. This associ-
ation of bureaucracy with the organisation of the state obscures the bureaucratic nature of non-state
organisational forms and decision-making mechanisms.
A substantial body of literature challenges the relevance of ‘bureaucracy’ to understand the function-
ing of public organisations (Clegg & Baumeler, 2010). Some describe these contemporary organisations
as ‘post-bureaucratic’ (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994), others as ‘soft bureaucracies’ in which classic
bureaucratic mechanisms are softened by cooperation, entrepreneurship, and self-management (Cour-
passon, 2000). A more fundamental critique even suggests that the social conditions for bureaucratic
organisations have eroded: based on the sociological analyses of Giddens and Beck (Beck, 1986; Beck
et al., 1994), some argue that reflection rather than instrumentality – which blindly follows the desire
for progress and efficiency – will form the future basis for legitimate decision making. The authority of
rational-legal institutions is no longer taken for granted, but needs to be proven in constant deliberation
with social actors and individual citizens (Hoogenboom & Ossewaarde, 2005).
Regardless of the contested validity of these claims (cf. Peters, 2001; Hodgson, 2004; Alvesson &
Thompson, 2006; Courpasson & Clegg, 2006; Adler, 2012), our analysis shows that, first, bureaucratic
forms can be understood more broadly than organisational structure. Instead, we can also find standardi-
sation, formalisation, and rationalisation in information and communication technology. Algorithms are
bureaucratic in the sense that they structure human behaviour and decision-making in similar ways as
bureaucratic organisations do – or perhaps even more so, given the reduction of judgement on individ-
ual cases to classification. Second, bureaucratic forms can be found beyond the beaten paths of public
service organisations. The new logic of surveillance capitalism and its reliance on algorithms suggest
that bureaucratic forms are alive and well in the private sector. Moreover, the use of algorithms for the
anticipation of behaviour – instead of merely determining a person’s status as beneficiary or obligate
– opens up new paths for bureaucratisation of the public sector beyond the confines of public service
provision.
It seems likely that algorithmic tools are here to stay. It is, therefore, worth discussing several paths to
mitigate the dangers of machine justice. Some suggest government regulation or an independent watch-
dog13 to guarantee ‘algorithmic accountability’14 and the possibility to evaluate algorithms on their de-
sign, input data, and possible biases.15 Others argue for including more diversity (people with different
backgrounds) in the phase of algorithm design to prevent bias.16 While useful, these suggestions do not
tackle the problem of decision displacement, which is less a matter of design and more a matter of use
in decision-making. To escape the temptations of algorithm-centred decision making, mechanisms are
needed that stress human assessment of individual cases. We suggest focusing on the empowerment of
citizens, such as strengthening the information position of citizens regarding the variables in algorithms
and the personal data that decision makers use, introducing a right to correction of unfair algorithmic
decision making, and introducing a stronger duty to motivate decisions based on algorithms regarding in-
dividual circumstances. Confronted with a further bureaucratisation of state-citizen interactions, citizens
should be given the means to restore the balance.
13https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/27/ai-artificial-intelligence-watchdog-needed-to-prevent-
discriminatory-automated-decisions (accessed 12 January 2018).
14http://harvardmagazine.com/2017/01/the-watchers (accessed 12 January 2018).
15http://www.techrepublic.com/article/biases-in-algorithms-the-case-for-and-against-government-regulation/ (accessed 12
January 2018).
16http://www.techrepublic.com/article/bias-in-machine-learning-and-how-to-stop-it/ (accessed 12 January 2018).
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